



Project Banyan

Phase 1: Ecosystem Overview

WORK IN PROGRESS

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Feb 2019



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
Agenda

1. Project scope and milestones (including exec meeting cadence)
2. Overview of recent ecosystem events
3. Proposed list of scenarios
4. Initial scenario analysis (in-progress)

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- Wendy

Play succeeds only when our partners succeed and find ongoing compelling value with us



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- Yooki

Existential Question

How do we continue to keep Play as the preeminent distribution platform for Android?

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Three major milestones to agree on (1) scenarios to deep-dive, (2) overall response strategy, and (3) specific initiatives by mid Q2

What are the biggest risks to Play's value proposition to partners?

Identify the **needs** of developers, OEMs, carriers, and users that Play doesn't meet, and **assets** that potential players¹ bring to app distribution

Identify the **most likely scenarios** for alternative app distribution, including **financial feasibility** of each

Milestone 1: Agree on most likely scenarios for deep-dives

In progress, targeting late Feb/early March

What should be our priorities to address these risks?

Evaluate the **outcome** and **impact** (economic & strategic) of the most likely scenarios

Identify the major **levers** to address the risks in the scenarios

Prioritize these levers and develop a high-level **strategy**

Milestone 2: Agree on the highest-impact levers and a high-level response strategy

ETA: ~end of March

What initiatives should we prioritize for 2019?

Identify **existing & new initiatives** to implement the strategy

Evaluate and prioritize initiatives based on **feasibility** and **impact**

Milestone 3: Agree on a response plan (initiatives to kick off or expand)

ETA: ~end of April

¹ Out of scope: MSFT launcher since this trend is not a Play specific issue, Subscriptions (e.g. Netflix) given their workarounds for Play billing are being addressed separately by Play team

- Yooki

Major deliverables by milestone

Milestone 1: Agree on most likely scenarios for deep-dives

In progress, target late Feb/early Mar

Ecosystem players analysis (OEM, Carrier, developers, users, others e.g. Amazon) - Needs, assets, economics (where relevant)

Scenario enumeration and modeling
- how each scenario plays out, and why it would happen

Preliminary analysis for discussion today

Recommendation of most likely scenarios for further deep-dives

Milestone 2: Agree on the highest-impact levers and a high-level response strategy

ETA: ~end of March

Impact analysis of most likely scenarios, including strategic and economic implications for Play

Enumerate available levers for counteracting or mitigating impact of scenarios & criteria to evaluate them

Recommended strategy based on prioritized levers to address the highest-impact risks

Milestone 3: Agree on a response plan (initiatives to kick off or expand)

ETA: ~end of April

Current or potential new initiatives to implement the recommended strategy

Impact and feasibility analysis of available initiatives, including high-level timelines and resourcing needs

Recommended initiatives for 2019H2 and beyond

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- Yooki

Stakeholders and updates

Sponsors

Jamie Rosenberg, Sameer Samat

Every ~4 weeks for milestone reviews

Steering Team

Paul Gennai, Tian Lim, Mike Hochberg, Shafiq Ahmed, Purnima Kochikar, Sri Krishnamachari

TBC: every ~2 weeks for progress reviews and input as needed

Working Team

Strategy	BizOps	Analytics	Finance	Play BD	Product	Eng
Atul K	Stephen K	Jon G	Mary O	Lawrence K	Matt H	TBD
Tim M	Wendy L	Sonia L	Josh O	Mike M		

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- Yooki
- Questions:
- Timing for Jamie / Sameer meeting (will need help from Paul)
- Try to have as needed meeting with Steering team

Critical Strategic Initiatives: Project Hug and Project Banyan

Initiatives necessary to sustain Google Play growth and provide value to key constituencies in 2019 and beyond

Project Hug

Project Banyan

Context

- Today's mobile game devs have new and different needs from the mobile devs of five years ago
- Some **mobile devs are questioning the value of Google Play** as a distribution partner; **considering alternatives**

- Google Play is **facing increased competition from app store rivals and other distribution channels** (OEMs, carriers), causing fragmentation & mindshare loss
- Meanwhile, some partners are applying **price pressure and experimenting with direct distribution models**

Key Questions

- What are **the new needs of today's mobile game devs**?
- How can Google Play help with those needs beyond traditional value-add (reach, security)?
- In what ways we **expand our xGoogle value proposition** to mobile devs who are increasingly asking for it?

- What are some **future scenarios that would challenge Google Play's continued growth as the leading Android app store**? What are the driving forces? What is the impact?
- **How could Play prepare for these possible futures** by changing its **product or business model**?

Outputs, Outcomes?







- Priority game developer segments and needs
- **x-PA commercial programs to enhance Google's gaming value proposition**
- **Timeline: execute in 1H 2019 (pilots underway)**

- Scenario definition with underlying motives, levers and tactics
- **Prioritized Play product and commercial changes for different constituencies to address fragmentation**
- **Timeline: Start execution in H2 2019 - H1 2020**

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- Tim

Recent developments: Ecosystem partners are investing in Game Distribution + exclusive content acquisition; key developers are evaluating options

STORE			GEO FOCUS	ACTIVITY	DETAILS	
Mobile	OEM		Samsung	Global	<ul style="list-style-type: none">70/30 standard rev share, 80/20 rev share for select partnersAggressively pursuing exclusive deals with major Android game developers (e.g. \$40M for exclusives from Niantic)Investing via direct payments, silicon optimization, and or DevTech resourcesGalaxy store on device home screen for S10 line	factpack
			One Store	Korea	<ul style="list-style-type: none">80/20 revenue share (originally 70%)More IAP promotionsTitles listed on OneStore automatically co-listed on Samsung Store	factpack
	Platform		Epic Store	Global	<ul style="list-style-type: none">88/12 rev share (likely) for new Android game store, based on rev share on PCBuilding dev credibility via Fortnite success and Unreal Engine brandFortnite MAUs / downloads on Android was subpar (technical issues)Secured few exclusives	factpack
			Amazon App Store	Japan	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Latent risk: stable MAU / catalog coverage, no major exclusives or new EoY promotions; ~15-20% IAP discounts	factpack
PC / Console			Steam (Valve)	Global	<ul style="list-style-type: none">3-tiered graduated rev share: 70/30 (<\$10M), 75/25 (\$10-50M), 80/20 (\$50M+)Lost some titles to Epic Store	factpack
			Discord	Global	<ul style="list-style-type: none">90/10 rev share; self-publishing game platformSome 90d exclusive indie titles and monthly game subscription service	details

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- Tim

Major working hypotheses & assumptions guiding our scenarios (1/2)

FOR DISCUSSION

Ecosystem players

OEMs

- **Samsung is the only OEM** with sufficient share **to plausibly build its own store in key Play markets** (71% share¹ of premium Android (\$600+) in top 10 Play countries)
- **Chinese OEMs lack sufficient share today in Play markets** to be an immediate concern outside China, but are a long-term consideration

Carriers

- **Carriers stores would have limited appeal to global developers** – but carriers may play a role in pre-install of other (OEM, developer, or 3P) stores

Developers

- **Major games with strong existing user bases are the likely driver of any new distribution platform** (top 10 devs ~25% of Play app & game revenue)
- **Biggest concern are AAA / Hi-Fidelity games or geographic-focused games** where Play's value proposition is weakest (~62% top AAA games² spend on Samsung devices, NCSoft / Mixi have 98% spend in KR / JP)
- **Other popular app categories lack a strong incentive to pursue alternative distribution**

1) Based on [IDC last 24 months unit sales](#) (2017-2018) 2) Based on [set of 15](#) representative hi fidelity, hi spend games

- Atul
- AAA, Hi Fidelity games are most likely, because Play's broad Android reach is less helpful to these games (e.g. focus on high-end devices for XX% revenue)
- Casual games are less likely drivers as Play's broad reach is more important (only XX% revenue on high end devices)

Major working hypotheses & assumptions guiding our scenarios (2/2)

FOR DISCUSSION

Ecosystem players

Users

- Users would **switch to a new distribution channel** only with a **strong draw - exclusive, high-profile titles, and/or sustained pricing advantage**
- Users would **stay on on alternative channel** with better pricing (discounts, loyalty programs), a sufficiently strong catalog over time, and transferability to new devices

Other 3P platforms

- **Amazon and MSFT are best positioned 3Ps** to disrupt games distribution with existing assets (Prime, Twitch, Xbox), 1P titles (for MSFT e.g. Minecraft, Halo) and willingness to invest

Macro trends

Emerging technology

- **5G:** Significant improvement in bandwidth and latency opens up new distribution channels
- **Cloud Streaming:** could disrupt game distribution by bringing console/PC games to mobile and enabling more cross-platform experiences

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- Atul
- AAA, Hi Fidelity games are most likely, because Play's broad Android reach is less helpful to these games (e.g. focus on high-end devices for XX% revenue)
- Casual games are less likely drivers as Play's broad reach is more important (only XX% revenue on high end devices)
- Carriers
- US
 - Single Country: Verizon
 - Multi-country: T-Mo (deutch telecom), Sprint (Softbank), AT&T (owns some Latin American Telcos)
- Japan (3 carriers own 85% of market)
 - NTT (some small overseas stakes, but mostly Japan)
 - KDDI (Mostly Japan)
 - Softbank (Lots of holdings in many tech companies, but Sprint is only telco)
- Korea
 - SK Telcom (has subsidiaries in China and Vietnam)
 - LG (no overseas telcom)
 - KT (has some small subsidiaries in mongolia and a few eastern european countries)

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Scenarios list *FOR DISCUSSION*

	Scenarios	Key assumptions // Likely players
OEM	1 Samsung app store goes big with exclusive AAA games, building a gaming distribution platform	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> OEMs invest in exclusivity to gain user base for store & future rev share
Developers	2 Major gaming platforms builds a store with titles from multiple developers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Epic Games, Steam, Tencent build mobile stores
	3 AAA gaming developer goes direct through side- or pre-loading	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Riot, Tencent, Activision, EA go direct
3P platforms	4 Amazon or Microsoft launches a complete gaming platform with distribution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> AMZN/MSFT drive uptake w/ exclusives & streaming Longer-term, AMZN builds out a complete app catalog
Carriers	5 OneStore goes big in Korea – inspiring carriers in JP and US to duplicate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Likely driven by major US or JP carriers – biggest Play markets
	6 Carriers drive streaming distribution – move high end gaming off Play to the Cloud	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Carriers package game streaming with 5G network rollout (e.g., PlayGiga model, VZN cloud gaming)
Other / multiple	7 Multiple alternatives stores emerge , and significantly erode the Android user experience	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Multiple stores create fragmentation and user / developer confusion

Note: Focusing on Top 3 + Next 7 Play markets (64% + 18% rev in 2018). NBU/BRIM strategy is out of scope

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Scenario 1: Samsung goes big w/exclusives to build successful Galaxy Store

PRELIMINARY – for discussion.

Underlined assumptions discussed on next page

Challenging to see Galaxy Store becoming attractive enough to developers to be a successful, sustainable stand-alone business

- To bootstrap adoption, need to spend \$27M - 36M to buy 2-month exclusive rights to [3 TBD] games (\$9-12M+ per title) per year
- Would need to offer ~80-20 revenue share (better than Play, but room to make margin)
- Need to believe that exclusives would build a user base loyal to the Galaxy Store (sufficient to drive ~20% of Samsung device consumer spend for co-listed apps to Galaxy store)
- Need to believe user base and rev-share attract 50 of top 100 games to co-list on the Galaxy store - *challenging; is ~\$1M in annual benefit sufficient to entice developers to co-list?*
- Net-net: successful store would yield margins of ~\$30M/yr in long run for Samsung to offset \$40-60M net investment¹ for first 2 years

Samsung *could* use game exclusives to drive hardware sales, but this would not hinge on building a sustainable game distribution business

1) Net investment net revenue share less exclusivity payments

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- Stephen
- 50 of 100 games selected given is sufficiently big enough to be of note to Play, while still be plausible

Scenario 1: Key assumptions and model output

Phase 1
3 exclusive titles
to bootstrap the
Galaxy store

Phase 2
Galaxy Store
with 50 co-listed
games

**Net impact to
Samsung**

- **\$9M-\$12M exclusivity payment per title**
 - \$9M: foregone revenue from missing 2mo of revenue on non-Samsung devices
 - \$12M: max Samsung could pay to breakeven on the store in 4 years
- **[3 TBD] exclusive titles for 2 months:** each title brings XM users and 20% of consumer spend, building a base large enough to attract users in Phase 2 (*in progress)
- **80-20 revenue share:** to be sustainable long term, Samsung's revenue share needs to be more than their 15% store operations cost (assume same as Play)
- **20% of consumer spend of the 50 co-listed games on Samsung Devices moves to Galaxy Store:** one known high profile game currently co-listed in Korea (Black Desert), finance estimates 5-20% user shift
- **~\$1M revenue upside from co-listing for each of 50 games**
 - ~\$110M average annual consumer spend on a Top 100 game on Play
 - 55% of consumer spend for these games on Samsung devices
 - 20% of consumer spend on Samsung shifts to Galaxy store from Play
 - 10% better revenue share on Galaxy store vs. Play (*assuming Play doesn't move from 70/30*)
- **Phase 1 (2 year investment):** +\$24M rev share - (\$27M to \$36M) exclusivity payment - \$18M to operate the store = \$20-30M investment per year x 2 years = \$40-60M
- **Phase 2 Profits:** \$120M revenue share - \$90M cost to operate the store = \$30 / yr profit

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Appendix I

Ecosystem needs and assets

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Ecosystem Review: Device OEMs

Unmet needs / motivation to pursue a Play alternative

1. **Differentiated software experience** (e.g. exclusive apps) to help turnaround slowing hardware sales
1. **New revenue streams** via apps & services to offset slowing hardware sales

Assets OEMs bring to a Play alternative

1. **Distribution power** via base of installed devices, ability to set pre-loads and push updates
2. **Technical capabilities** to optimize apps & hardware, esp. for high-end games
3. **Brand power & marketing investment**, e.g. Samsung co-marketing with Fortnite, esports sponsorships
4. **Existing app stores** for local OEMs in China, Samsung
5. (Limited) **User FoP** e.g., Samsung Pay

Scenario implications

Strong incentive for OEMs to act for both differentiation and service revenue

Strong opportunity for major OEMs to act - have the pieces needed for either direct distribution of select apps (e.g. Fortnite) or a broader app store offering (e.g. Samsung store)

Focus on Samsung, Huawei, Xiaomi (TBC) - high market share, esp. premium segment (most relevant to hi-fi games) and premium markets (KR, JP, US)

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Ecosystem Review: Developers

Unmet needs / motivation to pursue a Play alternative

1. Developers would **prefer a better revenue share** and do not always feel that Play (or Apple) justify their 30% share - esp. those with large existing fan bases (e.g. AAA games) or limited global ambitions
1. Developers have product & technical needs to support the development lifecycle [details [here](#)]

Assets Developers bring to a Play alternative

1. **Developers own IP** (apps, games, rights to franchises) — that **users spend money and time consuming**
1. **Small number of developers with the “best IP”** — the most desirable content with the most devoted fans, who will overcome significant barriers to get that IP

Scenario implications

Developers who see the **least benefit** from Play's global distribution and discovery have **biggest incentive** to seek cheaper alternatives - in particular, AAA games (focus of Project Hug)

Games developers also have **significant technical needs** that are not well-met by Play/Google offerings (e.g. LiveOps support)

Only select developers with **committed audiences** likely to forgo Play distribution entirely.

[TBD] Developers have limited incentive to tackle complexity of **co-listing** in alternative stores unless they have significant reach

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Ecosystem Review: Other 3P Platforms

Motivation to pursue mobile app/game distribution

1. **Amazon:** known **interest in gaming** (twitch, lumberyard), desire to **expand Prime ecosystem**, existing app store
1. **Microsoft:** Existing **gaming strength** (Xbox, PC), desire to **expand desktop services portfolio** to mobile (e.g., Bing)

Assets Developers bring to a Play alternative

1. **Bring exclusive 1P IP** (MSFT Office, Minecraft, Halo)
1. Enable unique **integrations with 1P platforms** (Prime, Twitch, Xbox)
1. Influence OEMs with access to **new device sales channels** (Amazon.com, MSFT Enterprise Sales)
1. Integration or discounts on **development platforms** (AWS, Lumberyard, Azure)
1. Deep pockets and willingness to invest

Scenario implications

Other 3P platforms have **compelling assets and deep pockets** to try to disrupt app/game distribution on Android...

...but **both have tried – and failed** – to do so in the past, but recent changes create opportunity:

- Openness of potential OEMs or Developers to partner
- Relative strength of platforms (e.g. complete gaming stack)
- Technology shifts (e.g., streaming, 5G, cloud)

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Ecosystem Review: Carriers

Unmet needs / motivation to pursue a Play alternative

1. Increase subscriptions or subscription prices with **exclusive / differentiated apps**
1. **New revenue streams** via apps & services

Assets Carriers bring to a Play alternative

1. **Connection to the user**
 - a. **FoP/DCB:** Carriers have a billing relationship w/users
 - b. **Influence of user's device purchase decision** at POS in store & online (e.g., merchandising, commissions)
1. **Influence over the OEM: Pre-loading** of carrier apps & app stores negotiated in commercial agreements w/OEMs
1. **Influence over the Developers: Network control & paid prioritization** could potentially impact developers ability to serve their apps to users

Scenario implications

Carriers in **markets with significant Play revenue** and **strong carrier presence in device retail** in best position to pursue app distribution

- Carriers in Korea, Japan, and US best positioned (e.g. Onestore)

Carriers would still need to **strike deals with OEMs** to pre-install stores - but some could offer developers **broader reach** than a single OEM

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Appendix II

Scenario analysis

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Scenario 1: Baseline assumptions driving the model

Assumption	Phase 1: 3 Exclusives	Phase 2: 50 co-listed games	Comment
Months of exclusivity for exclusive Samsung games	2	0	Moderate length exclusive to line up with critical first few months of a hardware launch
Number of exclusive games per year	3	0	Phase 1: Data request out to Play Analytics to validate Phase 2: No exclusives anymore – Galaxy store is self-sustaining
Share of consumer spend on top games on Samsung devices	62%	62%	Average of today based on representative apps. This is correlated with general market share of devices and would take time to shift
Share of consumer spend on Top 100 games on Samsung devices	54%	54%	Based on top 100 apps today. This is correlated with general market share of devices and would take time to shift
Galaxy store revenue share with devs	80%	80%	Assume it needs to be better than Play
Galaxy store revenue share for Samsung	20%	20%	Needs to be higher than 15% cost to operate the store
Galaxy Store share of Samsung device spend when exclusive	100%	100%	Game is exclusive – Galaxy store should get all of the spend
Galaxy Store share of Samsung device spend when co-listed	20%	20%	Based on high end of experience today of 5-20% for game Black Desert which is co-listed on Galaxy store for Phase
Number of top 100 titles co-listed on Galaxy store	0	50	Phase 1: Focus mostly on exclusives -- little other developer co-listing Phase 2: Significant co-listing among top 100 apps
Cost to operate the store as percent of store revenue	15%	15%	Based on number of Play finance

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- Yooki / Stephen

Scenario 1: Modest phone sales increases could fund Galaxy store investments, but unclear if exclusives or a store can affect units sales

**Context: Samsung Premium phone (>\$700) sales
2018 were 57M units (ex-China)**

Incremental Annual Unit sales	Incremental Units	Incremental Gross Profit for Samsung ¹
0.5%	295K	\$75M
1.0%	590K	\$150M
1.5%	885K	\$225M

If Galaxy store exclusives and/or store loyalty can help drive small incremental phone sales vs. Samsung baseline – could easily be worth \$100M+ per year

However, unclear at this time if:

- Exclusive titles would be able to drive such an increment
- The additional effort in building a successful store would make a difference

1) Assume ASP of \$853 (average of GS9, GS9+, Note 9) and Gross Margin of 30%
Reference: [OEM market share analysis](#)

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Appendix III

Ecosystem factpack - [link](#)

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
Appendix IV

Play business context

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Context: Overview of revenue concentration

Product



In-app purchases drive majority (70%+) of spend; ads in Play 20%

Geo

Q4-18	Top 3	Non-Top	Quarterly Trends
Play (non-Ads)	1,221.4	755.1	Share of Top 3 Rev
Rev. \$M:			7% 65% 67% 66% 65% 64% 63% 62%
y/y:	10%	33%	Y/Y Growth of Rev
Growth Contr. to Rev.:	6.9ppts.	11.3ppts.	5% 46% 53% 35% 34% 43% 43% 55% 55% 56% 56%
	(+1.6ppts. q/q)	(+1.8ppts. q/q)	0% 10% 8% 13% 8% -1% -2% -2% -4% JP

Top 3 countries (JP, KR, US) 62% of revenue, trending down

Developer

Q4-18	Top 10	Non-Top	Quarterly Trends
A&G Rev. \$M:	437.3	1,417.9	Share of Top 10 Rev.
y/y:	-15%	35%	9% 38% 34% 36% 33% 29% 26% 26% 24%
Growth Contr. to Rev.:	-5.0ppts.	23.2ppts.	Y/Y Growth of Non-Top Rev
	(+1.4ppts. q/q)	(+2.3ppts. q/q)	7% 37% 41% 39% 36% 33% 36% 33% 35% Non-Top

Top 10 devs ~25% of revenue, but declining QoQ

*Actuals up to 12/31/2018

Buyers


Q4-18	HVU	Non-HVU	Quarterly Trends
IAP Spend \$M	3,452.5	2,734.8	Share of HVU Spend
y/y	17%	20%	2% 54% 54% 57% 56% 55% 55% 56% 56%
Growth Contr. to IAP Spend:	9.6ppts.	8.5ppts.	Y/Y Growth of Non-HVU Spend
	(+3.1ppts. q/q)	(+1.3ppts. q/q)	36% 30% 31% 18% 24% 15% 17% 20% HVU

High Value Users (HVUs) still more than half of in app purchase spend

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Context: Play user-funnel

~2% of Play connected devices actually buy on Play



Google

* Data source: play_analytics.harmonia_play_active; 10/1/18 - 10/31/18
* All figures are 28D unless otherwise noted

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- FOP: Forms of Payment
- A&G: Apps and Games
- Store browsers: people who open the play store
- Acquirers: people that download apps from the play store

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WIP Slides - [link](#)

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Control Number : GOOG-PLAY-007329076

AllCustodians : Li, Christopher, Kochikar,
Purnima, Koh, Lawrence, Kolotouros,
Jim, Marchak, Michael, Wang,
Kevin

Title :

Filename : Project Banyan- Ecosystem
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